China Mediates the Middle East

Muhammet Ali Zurnaci, Istanbul

China’s latest sensational mediation between Saudi Arabia and Iran, aiming to restore their relations, can be evaluated primarily based on two scenarios.

Scenarios:

1. What if the mediation is useless, and the tense Iran-Saudi Arabian relationship continues as before due to Iran’s withdrawal from peace or Saudi Arabia’s renunciation? Tons of scenarios can be written here, such as:
   • Risks:
   • 1.1. Iran gives up because of an unprecedented military development in the Gulf.
   • 1.2. KSA withdraws as Yemen dramatically warms up from the South, surprising the whole world.
   • 1.3. Iran’s nuclear activity (let’s say a test or a threat after reaching level 100%) shocks the Middle East and the globe, and the deal falls short.
   • 1.4. Sudden assassinations in Riyadh cause very bad perceptions in KSA, and the deal is left.
   • 1.5. Iran is militarily and unexpectedly heavily involved in the conflict of Caucasia between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Involvement irritates the decision-makers of KSA, and the deal is broken.
   • 1.6. Saudi Youth nationalistically feels uncomfortable with Iran, and a new Arab Spring begins from within KSA. Nuclear and Persianic Iran is suddenly not desired by the Kingdom.
   • 1.7 Iranian Youth against the regime keeps tiring the resources of the Iranian Government, and Persian Spring (let’s say) does not like the Islamic Kingdom, and the deal is forgotten.

The probable scenarios that could be written to prove it was an ineffective diplomatic attempt would simply be enough to determine the negative limits of China’s political influence in the Middle East.

2. What if the mediation activity works and can reflect its effect on the military and economic spheres of influence? The main focus here is to identify the positive.

Securities

2.1. Neither KSA nor Iran wants an unstable Gulf.

2.2. Two middle powers with a great amount of hard power resources naturally are aware that any escalation would erode only themselves.

2.3. No one in the region or in the globe is interested in another and a more complex Iran-Iraq War.

2.4. Restoring economic relations can pave the way for the share of military technology.

2.5. The results of the global power competition between China and the US in the short and middle terms may serve the interests of the Gulf.

2.6. Economic cost of the risks is less than the current state of affairs. Let us do our best to recover our economies.

Timing and Timeliness

By the way, it is essential to draw the general framework, not to forget that the Saudi-Iran Mediation analyses are made at a time when China has remarkable diplomatic initiatives with Russia and even European Leaders are racing to visit China. To me, this time the framework of the present can be evaluated in two ways:

Both the Europeans and Middle Easterners are trying to use the China Card against the US to balance him or to minimize his abrasive influence; or

Strengthening China must be intent at conquering the whole world at once.

MAZ Corporate adopts that the first idea is far more close to the global and regional realities even if he is accepting the very relative meanings of these growing diplomatic noises causing and likely to cause auricular fullness.

Analyses:

Amry Hamzawy of Carnegie Middle East underlines that by mediating the Saudi-Iranian normalization agreement, China is veering into new territory, expanding its regional footprint “from economic exchange to negotiated conflict resolution.” 

Gilles Kepel of Al Monitor,  first evaluates the timing of China’s move underlining that mediation has come right after “a number of traditionally pro-western global south states declined to vote for the resolution against Russia at the UN.”  Then he claims that the endless war in Yemen where Iran and Saudi Arabia are fighting for years through proxy wars is where the limits of the diplomatic move’s ability to be a game changer can be measured.

Jon Alterman of CSIS, shorts The Chinese diplomatic approach to the region as “China’s diplomatic history in the Middle East is a record of seeking participation without deep involvement.”  He views the Chinese latest diplomatic initiative in the Gulf as “Partial Win.” although “the partial” is not clear in the analysis.

Giorgio Cafiero of Gulf State Analytics watches the warming diplomatic initiatives among Middle Eastern and Gulf Countries from 2020 including the latest Saudi-Iran agreement mediated by China.  “ This new era of diplomacy is best characterized as de-escalation and détente, but not necessarily a resolution of the deep ideological and strategic divergences between these countries.”

David Ignatius of the Washington Post conveys his interview with Kissenger on the aforementioned development: “I see it as a substantial change in the strategic situation in the Middle East,” Kissinger told me during an interview this week. “The Saudis are now balancing their security by playing off the U.S. against China.” In a comparable way, Kissinger notes, he and President Richard M. Nixon were able to play off tensions between Beijing and Moscow in their historic engagement with China.” 

Ignatius adds “The Middle East, so long a zone of confrontation, is becoming a balancing game. Saudi Arabia is newly friendly with China and Iran, but is also working with the United States by providing $400 million to Ukraine; spending $37 billion for 78 Boeing airplanes; and backing a new 5G and 6G cellular technology known as O-RAN that could supplant China’s Huawei.”

 “The truth is that a unipolar Middle East, where a dominant United States was encouraged in confrontational policies by its allies Saudi Arabia and Israel, wasn’t a very stable region. A multipolar Middle East, with its ceaseless hedging and balancing, will have its own dangers. And as Kissinger suggests, it will be a new game with new rules.”

Fabrice Balanche of University of Lyon underlines an interesting point: “After the Saudi-Iran pact and now a prospective rapprochement with Syria and the Kingdom, the U.S. is increasingly diplomatically sidelined. Middle East Nations are making peace without Washington.”

Ali Shibabi, a regional commentator and author, finds a relation between diplomatic act and regional power competition and finalizes his view as “ Competing regional interests between the Saudis and Iranians could be mitigated by the Beijing negotiated rapprochement and China gets a boost to its own regional profile.”

Stephen Kalin and Summer Said of Wall Street Journal underline the probable meaning of Iran’s diplomatic move: “Its rapprochement with Riyadh helps Tehran with its longstanding goal of diminishing U.S. influence in the Middle East, drawing one of Washington’s closest partners away from its orbit and bringing China into a more active diplomatic role in the region.”

Ali Vaez of International Crisis Group suggests that “the deal fits into Iran’s wider foreign policy strategy around the region and prospects for a broader detente between Iran and its Arab States in the Gulf. Moreover, a regional nuclear agreement between Iran and Arab States in the Gulf might be a more viable path than an agreement between Iran and the West.”

Abdolrasool Divsallar and Hesham Alghannam in the Cairo review of Foreign Affairs delineates the strategic calculus behind the agreement: “While the reconciliation seems to be a tactical de-escalation that serves mutual interests it is not a grand bargain…. It does not change the strategic calculus of either side in a revolutionary way and it is therefore unlikely to significantly transform the regional security environment in the short term. Indeed, there will be many continuities rather than changes in Saudi-Iranian relations.” Although there are many points I don’t agree with, their work looks the most rational one on the deal up to now.

Up to here Analyzes have underlined: “Footprint”, “Timing”, “Limits”, “Gain”, “Detente”, “Balancing”, “Play Off”, “Multipolarity”, “Sidelining”, “Profile”, “Diminishing US Influence”, “Mitigating Regional Interests”, “Nuclear Agreement”, “Tactical De-Escalation” 

and “Strategic Thinking”

Mohammed Khalid Al Yahya of Harvard tells that “China has been establishing important economic relations with both Saudi Arabia and Iran. In the New Middle East, it seems that only China possesses the will and the leverage required to guarantee a deal between the region’s two most powerful competitors.”Although I agree with this, I don’t agree with the following view of “the deal has less to do with any warming of bilateral relations between the two countries than it does with China’s ambition to fill the power vacuum left by America’s departure.”

On the contrary, I think that the specific weight of the mediation looks in favor of KSA and Iran and is less about the Chinese influence in the Middle East. For me, the Middle Powers’ Convergence of Interest cannot produce such a heavy factor that it can strategically and asymmetrically change the balance of power as in the latest example of Chinese mediation.

Here is why:

“Criticism,” “Contingency,” and “Contribution”

Criticism

One should neither exaggerate nor underestimate “the meaning” of the latest diplomatic initiative together with other related activities in the region. To determine the most suitable and rational meaning is highly crucial to stay away from the influence of speculation.

Contingency

While the undiversified Iranian economy is growingly China-dependent due to her export share, Saudi’s external debt is doubling to $250B, and KSA’s export share of China has increased in 5 years from 13% to 20%. In addition to an increase in share, OPEC+’s latest decision of “production cut” will help oil prices go up. It looks natural and rational for both of them to work to heal economically after the Corona Crisis. Moreover, the OPEC+ Decision, which came after the Saudi-Iran mediation, might not only be related to the external debt of Saudi Arabia but also her fiscal policies. Iran is economically in trouble and tired of a long-standing internal unrest. Moreover, the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict leads to new risks from the south (military and economic) for Iran. Both The KSA and Iran have been in need of what I had called “material therapy” since the 2020 Corona Crisis. China’s diplomatic opportunism has given birth within such a regional contingency. 

Contribution

• Mutual Interests between China and ME countries are still based on mostly economic transactions. So, still there is no home for “grand strategy.”
• China is slowly upgrading his power profiles through eco-political activations but the permanence of his relatively upgraded profile is still transcontinentally very vulnerable. So, the footprint is not as deep as the flowing storm of speculation. 
• Specific weight of the mediation looks in favor of KSA and Iran and is less about the Chinese influence in the Middle East.
• Timing : It is happening not only when Global South declines to vote against Russia, but also The Gulf Powers are searching for areas to recover their economies in a de-escalated season.
• China’s Prestige in the hearts and minds is relatively increasing (perception of power) although its socialist worldview is not embraced by neither the Democratic nor the Islamic World.
• Symbolism of Chinese Diplomacy may tell the US that “If you come around Taiwan Strait militarily, I come at least to Hormuz Strait politically and do a sensational mediation.” 
• Without exaggerating or underestimating, MAZ Corporate calls the meaning of the latest Chinese act as “An important signal a little more than a symbolism but still less than a sphere of influence.”
• The Chinese economic sphere of influence in Iran is not likely to extend to the whole Gulf in the foreseeable future.
• Israel – China Relations ahead may be far more critical for the Middle East than the Gulf Diplomacy in the near future.
• Strategic Definition of the Middle East is not yet multipolar but not anymore a shiny reflection of unipolarity. Neither numbers nor the behavioral environment monitors it. China-Israel relations in the middle run will be crucially determinative at this point. So for now, Let’s say  “Though Not MultiPolar, A Less Unipolar..”
• Gulf mediation can promote an influence far beyond a diplomatic initiative in the middle run throughout the Caucasia and Eurasia if Chinese decision makers decide to get involved in escalating conflicts affecting regional and sub-regional functions. However it seems he wants to stay in diplomatic roles at least for now.
• Global Agenda Setting is increasingly advertising China even if more and more people talk negatively about him. Producing a growing agenda of China may have a double face. Global analysts may need “a giant scapegoat” while they are unconsciously advertising a  “power” in the subconscious mind of the masses according to MAZ Corporate Consulting.  
• Some recent analysis on China proves that “writing all the diplomatic meetings down and trying to delineate a particular image by correlating all” does not always work. Irrelevancies or cacophonies in some analyzes unfortunately scream.
• Exaggerating the moves of economic recovery of developing middle power countries together with China’s opportunist but highly limited diplomatic initiative has still not created a multipolar Middle East. 
• Success is not stemmed from Chinese diplomatic genius but from the convergence of interests of both KSA and Iran.
• While the deal is Useful for China’s Global and Regional Prestige in addition to partial economic gains, it is a Need for Iran and Saudi Arabia.  So It is a Tripartite Convergence of Interest
• Risks are more likely than Securities regarding the Detente. 
• The Probable Taiwan Crisis in the near future in addition to the never-ending Ukraine Crisis may turn the whole game upside down everywhere in the world.
• China-Iran-KSA may think that the US can not dance as effectively as in the past  throughout the Gulf while it is increasingly engaged in Ukraine and seems likely to engage in Taiwan.
• US approach to Saudi-Iran detente might be “staying silent” a while longer, If the South China Sea gets hotter than ever. 
• The U.S. strategic mind may be using Chinese Opportunism for his future Alarmisms, thinks MAZ Corporate.
• The more the U.S. gets blind to “diplomatic” vacuums, the more China takes the advantage of filling them.
• Strategic Calculus for the Middle East would be possible for China if we could see a Global China involved in all these hot spots below with his military, economic, political and ideological means:

• Gulf Military Balance, including Iran’s Nuclear agreement,
• Caucasia Conflict (Azerbaijan-Armenia)
• Eurasia Crisis (Ukraine War)
• Critical Middle East Crisis such as:
•  – Hezbollah-Israel Clashes, – Palestine-Israel Discord, – Houthis in Yemen, – Iraq and Problem of Powershare, – Syria’s Multiple Crises.

Therefore, despite asymmetric and triggering meanings of the mediation, it is too early to say “Strategic China for the Middle East” or “Strategic Saudi-Iran Alignment for the Region.” While the mediation particularly means “An important signal more than a symbolism but still less than a sphere of influence”, it more broadly points to a “Though Not Multipolar, A Less Unipolar Region.” in the middle term.

The US will not sit and wait for the growing diplomatic activation of China till the end of time. Now MAZ Corporate foresees that the US will likely sit, watch and calculate the limits of China in the Middle East for some more time. The forthcoming Taiwan crisis could quickly backlash the limited Chinese spheres of influences all over the world including the Middle East.

Muhammet Ali Zurnaci

13 April 2023, Istanbul

MAZ Corporate